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Did rights-based management induce bycatch 
avoidance? 
Pre-Amendment 80 (prior to 2008):
The Bering Sea Groundfish Fishery
- Target species TACs allocated as common property over 
multiple “sub-seasons”
- TAC for PSC (e.g. halibut) allocated to target species 
fisheries
- Target fisheries typically closed due to binding PSC TAC
Pre-Amendment 80 (prior to 2008):
The Bering Sea Groundfish Fishery
- Target species TACs allocated as common property over 
multiple “sub-seasons”
- TAC for PSC (e.g. halibut) allocated to target species 
fisheries
- Target fisheries typically closed due to binding PSC TAC
- Target species and PSC allocations vested directly into 
cooperatives or limited access fishery
- Initially one cooperative formed: 16 vessels, 7 companies
Post-Amendment 80 (2008 and after):
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Figure 5.2: Weekly production and closures - Weekly production and fishery closures
for the BSAI groundfish fisheries in 2006. Data is from the weekly production reports.8
mented to the BSAI Fishery Management Plan. The provisions of A80 were designed to
facilitate increased target catch and profits, reduced bycatch and discards, and increased
flexibility while complying with target and prohibited species TACs. Implementation of A80
made a number of changes to the state of fishery regulations at the time. First, A80 e↵ec-
tively limited future entry into the fishery and granted a defined share of the total A80 TAC
for the six target species (yellowfin sole, rock sole, flathead sole, Pacific cod, Atka mackerel,
and Pacific Ocean perch) to each vessel according to their catch history. Second, vessels could
vest their shares in either a cooperative formed by participating members or in a limited
access common pool fishery. Cooperatives are given considerable flexibility as to how catch
entitlements are internally allocated. Leasing arrangements and/or non-arms-length meth-
ods of internal reallocation are all feasible, and some trading between cooperatives is allowed
as well. Vessels that join the limited access fishery vest their shares to a common pool that
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Figure 5.8: Change in E↵ort distribution - Di↵erence between pre- and post-A80 spatial
distribution of e↵ort. Larger values in red indicate relatively more e↵ort after A80 versus before
A80.
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Figure 5.9: Spatial distribution of rock sole CPUE - Inverse distance weighted interpo-
lation of rock sole CPUE for 2005-2007 (left) and 2008-2010 (right).
 
Figure 8: Estimates of the change in probability of movements of a given minimum distance relative to 
2007 conditional on the percentage of halibut in the previous haul for cooperative members in the Bering 
Sea fishery. Estimates are derived from a linear probability model and error bars reflect 95% confidence 
intervals using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.  
 
 
Figure 9: Proportion of weekly fishing in nighttime hours by year for the cooperative portion of the fleet 
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- large scale movements out of 
halibut-rich areas
- finer scale movements after 
hauls with a large proportion of 
halibut 
- less fishing at night when halibut 
bycatch is more prevalent  
Abbott et al. (2013) found:
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Figure 5.14: Daily halibut per rock sole - Box-and-whisker plots and kernel-smoothed
densities of daily halibut per rock sole.
all inputs and other outputs constant. As an approximation of this, Figure 5.15 presents
a scatter plot of daily rock sole and halibut catch and the best fitting quadratic function
within a small range of daily fishing duration.25 To account for the di↵erent sampling scheme
before and after A80, I divide daily production and fishing hours by the number of trawls
in a day. The figure clearly displays the very di↵erent subsets of the production set that are
sampled before and after A80, reminiscent of the simulated production sets in Chapter 4.
The fitted quadratic functions suggest that post-A80 production frontiers lie well above those
pre-A80, indicating that considerably more rock sole is caught for a given level of halibut are
A80. While this supports those findings in Figure 5.14, it also indicates that the absolute
production of rock sole increased substantially, despite the lower amounts of halibut caught.
25I omit the range of daily fishing duration to protect the confidentiality of fishermen. The best quadratic
fit was estimated without a constant to be consistent with the idea of null-jointness presented in Chapter 4.
Estimation with a constant produced similar patterns.
Changes in Bycatch Intensity
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Figure 5.15: Production set in rock sole–halibut space - Sample daily production set
in rock sole–halibut space for a small window of daily trawling hours. Production is divided
by the number of trawls in a day.
5.5 The output distance function
While Figure 5.15 provides some evidence of a shift in the reduced form production fron-
tier, the fitted quadratic functions do not qualify as a bonafide production frontier since the
production of other outputs is not being held constant, nor do they account for other pos-
sible mechanisms such as ine ciency or heterogeneity in fishermen. Thus, a more rigorous
investigation of the transformation function defining the frontier of the PPF is needed. As
previously discussed, a transformation function approach to describing technology su↵ers
from the fact that the transformation function cannot be identified empirically without im-
posing some form of normalization. For this reason, ? and ? found it convenient to work
with a normalized form of the transformation function called the output distance function.
The output distance function represents the distance an output bundle is away from
A Hyperbolic Distance Function Approach
Transformation Function:
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x = y = b =inputs good outputs bad outputs
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and outputs are invariant to regulatory changes. Since these e↵ects shape technological sub-
stitution patterns, I follow Färe et al. (2005) and allow all technological parameters to vary
over time so that measures of substitutability and the curvature of the PPF have maximum
flexibility.
As discussed in Section 5.2, one potential problem with the above approach is that changes
in regulations between seasons may be confounded with changes in other seasonal fishing
technology variables, such as the size and distribution of the latent fish stock. While it is
possible to include fishery independent measures of biomass in the distance function (Pascoe
et al., 2007), stock assessments in the Bering Sea are performed annually (Figure 5.4) and
do not have su cient independent variation for identification once seasonal fixed e↵ects are
included. Instead, I omit measures of the latent fish stock and interpret the estimation
results in light of the stock assessments in Figure 5.4.
5.7.1 Likelihood Function and Error Distribution
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (5.18) will consistently estimate the
slope parameters of the HDF since OLS is asymptotically robust to non-normality; how-
ever, OLS will not provide consistent estimates of the constant terms if we believe that
E("its) 6= 0. While only the slope parameters are necessary to provide information on out-
put substitutability, we are also concerned with the location of the production frontier, which
is fundamentally determined by the constant terms. Thus, accounting for the non-normality
of " that arises from the one-sided distribution of the ine ciency term u is essential for our
analysis. Accordingly, estimation of the parameter matrices in equation (5.18) is achieved
through maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) once distributional assumptions are made
for each component of ".
I follow the convention of assuming the stochastic error component is normally, indepen-
dently and identically distributed vits ⇠ N [0,  v] and independent of all future, contempora-
neous, and past ine ciencies uits. Typical assumptions for the ine ciency component include
the half-normal distribution, u = |U | where U ⇠ N [0,  u] (Aigner et al., 1977), truncated-
normal distribution, u ⇠ N [µ,  u] u   0 (Jondrow et al., 1982), exponential distribution,
u ⇠  (1,  u) (Aigner et al., 1977), and gamma distribution, u ⇠  (k,  u) (Greene, 1990).
The truncated-normal and gamma distributions o↵er the greatest flexibility for modeling the
y = y⇤ev u b = b⇤eu v DH(x, y⇤, b⇤) = 1and where
=) DH(x, yeu v, bev u) = 1
D
H(x, y, b) = ev u=)
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The MES is a primal measure of the elasticity of substitution, and thus, unlike its cost
function counterpart (see Blackorby and Russell, 1981), it does not measure substitutability
along the e cient frontier (Stern, 2011).35





This means that the relative opportunity cost of bad output reduction becomes more di cult
as the good to bad output ratio (y/b) increases if and only if MESby > 1.
5.7 Model specification
I modify Greene’s (2005) “true” fixed-e↵ects panel data model for single output SPF es-
timation to represent a distance function that captures unobserved and technological het-
erogeneity across harvesters and seasons. Greene’s (2005) “true” fixed-e↵ects model allows
for time-varying ine ciency and a time-invariant individual-specific fixed-e↵ect that can be
correlated with any input or output in the model. Similarly, I specify the distance function
to include season-specific distance function parameters and individual-season fixed-e↵ects.
Following the discussion in Section 5.5.1, I model the log of the HDF for individual harvester














































= "its = vits   uits,
34See Appendix B.1 for a derivation of this result. Note that the formula for MESby in Färe et al. (2005)
is derived letting y in the fixed output ratio (y/b) change, rather than letting b change as I do here.
35To see this, note that MESby lets b vary in the ratio y/b while holding all other inputs and outputs—
including y—constant. Thus, it must be true that distance to the frontier is also changing since no other
inputs or outputs are allowed to adjust to keep distance constant. Thus, MESby does not keep distance con-
stant and thus does not measure substitutability along the frontier. Stern (2010) has developed a symmetric
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Larger MRT implies a greater shadow value of halibut 
reduction.
Smaller elasticity implies greater potential to substitute 
rock sole for halibut reduction.
y = rock sole b = halibut
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on a di↵erent “higher” PPF such as point C. Thus, while interesting in itself, the MRT does






















Figure 5.17: Marginal rate of transformation (MRT ) - MLE estimated MRTby between
halibut (b) and rock sole (y)—evaluated at the seasonal sample means—as derived in equa-
tion (5.10) for the annual (left) and B&A (right) model. Whiskers represent 95% confidence
intervals computed using the delta method.
5.8.2 Relative Substitutability (subs)
The discussion in Section 5.6.3 suggests that a unit-free measure of substitutability may be
desirable since we would expect MRTby to increase as the good to bad output ratio increases.
The elasticity of the PPF (subby) normalizes MRTby by the observed output mix, and thus,
is a relative measure of substitution indicating the percentage decrease in rock sole necessary
to obtain a marginal percentage decrease in halibut. According to the definition of subby in
equation (5.13), this is just the negative of the first row of Table 5.7 divided by the second
Marginal Rate of Transformation
Relative Substitutability

















Figure 5.18: Relative substitutability (sub) - MLE estimated mean sub between halibut
(b) and rock sole (y) as derived in equation (5.13) for the annual (left) and B&A (right) model.
Whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals computed using the delta method.
5.8.3 Morishima elasticity of substitution (MES)
As discussed in Section 5.6.4, MES provides a measure of the curvature of the PPF, quan-
tifying the rate at which MRTby increases as the good to bad ratio (y/b) increases. MES
will take on a negative value if the outputs are substitutes and a positive value if the outputs
are complements. We would thus expect MESby to be positive between rock sole and hal-
ibut. The size of the value is a measure of the strength of the substitute/complementarity
relationship. In particular, values of MESby that are greater in magnitude imply that a
marginal reduction in halibut bycatch will come at a relatively higher opportunity cost.
I estimate MESby for both the annual and B&A models, evaluated at the seasonal mean
(Figure 5.19).48 As expected, MESby is positive—indicating that rock sole and halibut are
48See equation (B.7) in Appendix B.1 for the actual statistic for MESby.
Frontiers: Rock sole-Halibut Space
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Figure D.1: Estimated production possibilities frontiers. - MLE estimated PPFs in
rock sole - halibut space for the annual and post normal-exponential model.















0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Halibut (mt)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Conclusion
Targeting “ability” in prior to A80 primarily determined by 
lack of incentives to avoid halibut bycatch 
• Ex ante predictions likely reflect far more about 
incentives for substitutability than technological 
possibilities for substitutability
• Need to understand what the relevant margins of 
production are, which are fishery and context specific
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Figure 5.4: Biomass estimates - (left) Stock assessment estimates of biomass. Estimates
for cod, yellowfin sole, and rock sole biomass (left axis) are obtained from NPFMC (2011).
Estimates for halibut biomass (right axis) is obtained from Hare (2011). (right) Percentage
di↵erence in biomass estimates from 2007.
5.3 The rock sole/cod fishery
For reasons discussed above, I limit my analysis to the early season rock sole/cod fishery
(henceforth RS fishery) in the Eastern Bering Sea for the years 2005 to 2010. The RS fishery
is relatively well-defined prior to A80 implementation by the opening season date (January 20
every year), the fishery closing date (Table 5.1), and the fact that the other major subfishery
at this time of year takes place in a distinctly di↵erent geographical region (i.e. the Atka
mackerel fishery in the Aleutian Islands). For the years 2005 to 2007, the RS fishery was
closed prematurely due to a binding halibut TAC, leaving a large portion of the rock sole and
cod TACs unharvested. The end of the RS fishery is not particularly well-defined post-A80
however, since there is no o cial closing of the fishery. To remedy this, I choose a post-A80
